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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA K. JONES, widow, and DONNA 
JONES, ~IELBA JOXES, IIAROLD JONES, 
LINDA JONES and SHIRLEY JONES, 




THE INDUS~rRIAL CO~LMISSION OF UTAH 
and CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF AND ASSOCIATE 
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Comes now the defendants in the above entitled 
cause, and respectfully petition this Honorable Court 
for a rehearing in said cause for the reasons and upon 
the grounds hereinafter briefly set forth: 
I 
The Court erred in holding that Dr. Peterson's 
testimony was "that it was his opinion that in this case 
the exertion did cause the clot", and hence erred in 
holding that there was no conflict in the medical testi-
mony. 
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II 
The Court erred in holding- that the deceased as 
a matter of fact and of law was in the course of his 
employment subject to exertion and fatigue to an 
extent sufficient to be a contributing- factor to his coro-
nary occlusion. 
III 
The Court erred in holding- that the Commission 
was arbitrary and capricious in its finding that the 
death of the deceased was not contributed to by any of 
the conditions or activities of the deceased in connection 
with his employment. 
IV 
The Court erred in holding- that the Commission 
acted arbitrarily in refusing- to find that the injury to 
the deceased did result from his employment. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORrr OF PETITION FOR REHEAR-
ING 
As counsel for defendants we approach the matter 
of this petition with infinite deference to the Court, as 
it is apparent from the nature of the opinions rendered 
and the length of time the court had the matter under 
consideration that the problem presented has received 
the deepest thought. However, it is likewise apparent 
from the opinions that the majority of the court has 
failed fully to appreciate the effect of its reversal ·of 
the facts found by the Commission, or to recognize the 
conclusiveness of the findings of the Commission upon 
the facts, and to the end that the court may re-examine 
the question and correctly interpret the law applicable 
thereto, this petition and brief is respectfully filed .. 
2 
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'Ye of nec-essity as::mme that the court will accord 
us freedom to express our criticism of the decision of 
the majority, and to develop our views thereon. We 
sincerely feel that serious and grave error will result 
if the opinion heretofore rendered is released. The 
question involved is in part that of jurisdiction between 
the Industrial Commission and this Court, and the ex-
tent to which this Court can control the Commission 
in its findings in Workmen's Compensation cases; a 
matter of grave concern to the public generally. 
rrhe sum and substance of the majority opinion 
herein is ( 1) that there was no conflict in the medical 
evidence, and hence the Commission was arbitrary in 
refusing to find a causal connection between the em-
ployment and the injury, as found by Dr. Zeman and 
Dr. Olson upon the hypothetical facts assumed by them: 
and (2) that the Commission was arbitrary in failing 
to find as true facts those matters assumed as true by 
Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson as the premise for their 
conclusion of causal relationship. The assignments of 
error fall under one or the other of these points, and 




THERE WAS A CONFLICT IN THE MEDI-
CAL TESTIMONY, AND HENCE THE COM-
MISSION WAS NOT ARBITRARY IN FIND-
ING NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN 
THE EMPLOYMENT AND THE INJURY. 
There is little we can say on this point which is not 
stated by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion, 
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but we would te remiss in our duty as attorneys for 
defendant if we did not ourselves challenge the tortur-
ing by the majority of this Court of the word "possibly" 
in the statement by Dr. Peterson 
''My own opinion is that it possibly 1s related 
in this particular case * * *.'' 
into a meaning that in his opinion the exertion "did 
cause the clot". We can only conclude with Mr. Just-
ice Wolfe that this interpretation by the majority 
"is born of a desire to harmonize his testimony 
with that of the other two doctors." 
and thus enable the majority of the Court to escape the 
dilemma of any conflict in the medical testimony. 
Where, then, is the capriciousness~ Is it the 
Industrial Commission which, after hearing the wit-
ness, the inflection of his words, his manner of speaking, 
chose to interpret his meaning of the word "possibly" 
as that of there being a very remote likelihood of any 
causal connection~ Or is it the majority of this Court, 
who to gain a uniformity of testimony on the parti-
cular point, impress upon the word a meaning at com-
plete variance with that normally attributed to iU 
We have posed the query as to which is arbitrary 
or capricious In this particular matter - the Commis-
sion in ascribing to the word ''possibly'' a negative 
conclusion, or the majority of this court in attributing 
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~\.~~·'tlllll' that Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson had testi-
fied in their opinion there "·as 110 causal connection 
between the employment and the injury. Dr. Petersen 
had then testified just as he did : 
·'I can't answer the question yes or no 
because I don't think the medical literature from 
my own opinion or anybody else's opinion can 
say dogmatically this is a definite cause, because 
the medical literature is full of statements that 
there is some relationship between effort and 
coronary thrombosis; and the literature is full 
of statements to the effect that apparently effort 
has no relationship to coronary thrombosis . . . 
My own opinion is that it possibly is related in 
this particular case, but I don't think you can 
dogmatically say that it is a cause and effect 
or it has no effect." (Emphasis added) 
Then upon this testimony of Dr. Petersen the Com-
mission had found a causal connection and made an 
award, and the finding of the Commission had been 
challenged as arbitrary in assigning to the opinion of 
Dr. Petersen a meaning at complete variance with any 
normal use of the words. 
Frankly, we have not the slightest doubt that this 
Court on review would refuse to permit the Commis-
sion, in order to gain an award to twist the phrase "it 
possibly is related in this particular case'' into a mean-
ing that there was causal connection. 
Yet that is just what the majority of this Cou~ 
itself here does. In order to defeat the negative im-
plication of Dr. Petersen's testimony it (arbitrarily) 
asserts that Dr. Petersen did not mean what he said, 
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and that while he testified that there· was but a remote 
likelihood of any connection, what he in fact meant 
was that ''in his opinion in this case the exertion did 
cause the clot". 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT 
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS IN FAILING 
TO FIND AS TRUE FACTS THOSE MAT-
TERS ASSUJ\1:ED AS TRUE BY DR. ZEMAN 
AND DR. OLSON, AS THE PRE~IISE FOR 
THEIR CONCLUSION OF CAUSAL RELA-
TIONSHIP. 
No one likes to be accused of being arbitrary or 
capricious - much less to admit it. We cannot sin-
cerely ascribe any arbitrariness to the Commission in 
giving a negative implication to Dr. Petersen's testi-
mony, tather than an affirmative implication as does 
the majority of the Court, but likewise we cannot require 
the Court to accept our views. In other words, it's one 
of those things we can't do anything about other than 
to urge upon the court the logic of the proposition 
that it is far less arbitrary for the Commission to in-
terpret the words of Dr. Petersen in their normal and 
usual way, than for this Court to ascribe to them a 
meaning which it admits is exactly "opposite" their 
usual connotation. 
We can, however, do something about the secon,d 
point of our argument, namely, demonstrate to this 
court that it has inadvertently acted outside and in 
excess of its jurisdiction in finding this injury to be 
employment connected, when the Commission's find-
ing on this particular point is to the contrary. 
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The line of demarl'ation fixing the Supreme Court·~ 
jurisdiction to reYiew decision~ by the Industrial Com-
mission is express in the statutes. Section 42-1-78 in 
part provides 
•' * * • The review shall not be extended 
further than to determine: 
( 1) Whether or not the commission acted 
without or in excess of its powers. 
(2) If findings of fact are made, whether or 
not such findings of fact support the award 
under review.'' 
And Section -!2-1-79 (as amended) 
''After each formal hearing, it shall be the 
duty of the commission to make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law irt writing an4 file 
the same with its secretary. The findings and 
conclusions of the commission on questions of 
fact shall be conclusive and final and shall not 
be subject to review; such questions of fact shall 
include ultimate facts and the findings and con-
clusions of the commission. * * * . '' 
Pronouncements by this court adhering to this line 
of demarcation are myriad. A rather composite analy-
sis of the matter is to be found in the decision i:p_ the 
case of Norris v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 256, 
61 P. 2d 413 (cited by this Court in the opinion) as 
follows: 
"It may be well to sum up the principles 
laid down in a number of previous cases regard-
ing the jurisdiction of this court over awards 
and orders of the Commission. 
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'' 'l,he Legislature has, in effect, said: 
'The Commission is the final arbiter of 
the facts. If there is error in judgment or 
conclusions of or from facts, it must be the 
Commission's error and remain there. We 
give the Supreme Court the right to speak 
onl.v by warrant of law in compensation 
cases when it speaks in reference to errors 
of law alleged to have been made by the 
Commission.' 
" * * * 
"Where the matter presented on appeal is 
the question of whether the commission should 
have in law arrived at a conclusion of fact dif-
ferent from that at which it did arrive from the 
e'Vidence, a question of law is presented only 
when it is claimed that the commission could 
only arrive at one conclusion from the evidence, 
and that it found contrary to that inevitable 
conclusion. But in order to reverse the com-
mission in this regard it must appear at least 
that (a) the evidence is uncontradicted, and (b) 
there is nothing in the record which is intrin-
sically discrediting to the uncontradicted testi-
mony and (c) that the uncontradicted evidence 
is not wholly that of interested witnesses or, 
it the uncontradicted evidence is wholly ot 
partly from others than interested witnesses, 
that the record shows no bias or prejudice on 
the part of such other witnesses, and (d) the 
uncontradicted evidence is such as to carry a 
measure of conviction to the reasonable mind 
and sustain the burden of proof, and (e) pre-
cludes any other explanation or hypothesis as 
being more or equally as reasonable, and (f) 
there is nothing in the record which would in-
dicate that the presence of the witnesses gave 
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the commission such an advantage over the eourt 
in aid to its conclusions that the conclusions 
should for that reason not be disturbed.'' 
Thus the law is well settled. Questions of fact 
are for the Commission, and for the Commission alone. 
We apply this principle to the instant case. 
The testimony of Dr. Olson and Dr. Zeman of a 
causal connection was based upon a stated set of facts, 
the existence of which the doctors were required to as-
sume. But their opinions of necessity can be no stronger 
than the premise upon which they rest, namely, the exis-
tence of the facts assumed, a 11 d whether those fa.cts 
exist or not is for the Commission to determine. Not 
for the doctors and not for this court. This determina-
tion is for the Commission alone. 
The Court criticizes the Commission for not ac-
cepting the conclusions of the doctors' testimony that 
there was causal connection. We submit that the cri-
ticism at best can be well founded only if the facts, and 
all of the facts, assumed by the doctors did in law exist. 
The Commission found that some thereof did not. The 
question then becomes, not whether the Commission · 
was arbitrary in declining to accept the doctors' con-
clusions, but whether it was arbitrary in failing to 
accept as established in law those facts upon which the 
doctors premised their conclusions. 
In fact it goes even further. Fatigue and exertion 
certainly are here involved. The doctors' . conclusio:n:s· 
are premised upon a degree of fatigue and exertion 
being present. No one· testified directly upon these 
matters, so the question of whether Jones was . either 
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fatigued or exerted himself, and if so, the degree there-
of, must be inferred from the testimony of what he 
was and what he had been doing; In other words, the 
concluding fact as to whether the deceased was fatigued 
or exerted himself is derived, not from the evidence 
itself, but from the inferences to he drawn therefrom. 
Now, whose duty is it to draw inferences from the 
evidence 1 This, too, has been well settled by the deci-
sions of the c.ourt. One of the later pronouncements 
is that of Utah Fuel Compa;ny v. Industrial Commission, 
102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070: 
''It is not the duty or right of this court to 
say what inferences, or conclusions must he drawn 
from the facts, so long as there is competent evi-
dence to sustain them. This proposition has been 
reiterated so often in numerous decisions that 
further citations of cases is unnecessary.'' 
We return to our premises. Both Dr. Zeman and 
Dr .. Olson agreed that a degree of exertion and fatigue 
was. necessary to their theory. With respect to fatigue 
Dr. Zeman testified upon cross examination as follows: 
"Q So that when you come down to it after 
all, it is a question that if there is any causal 
connection between fatigue and coronary throm-
bosis or occlusion, it is a question of degree, 
isn't itf 
''A Well, yes. 
'' Q In other words, I might get very tired 
by undergoing some exertion whereas you might 
not get tired doing it. 
10 E: 
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"A You will not expect the same effects. I 
mean you may not be conscious of the same ef-
fect, but certainly you would haYe fatigue similar. 
"Q Yes, but I would not have fatigue that 
would be of that degree that would cause coro-
nary occlusion' 
"A No. 
• 'Q So that after all it is a question of the 
effect, isn't it' That is a question in a parti-
cular case under which the trier of the fact 
thought there is such a degree of fatigue that 
it might affect the coronary to such an extent 
that you have indicated, isn't that right~ 
"A I don't follow that. 
'' Q After all, it being a question of the 
degree of fatigue, then it is a question of the 
effect to either be determined by whoever is ex-
pressing an opinion, or by the trier of facts as 
in this case, whether or not that fatigue is suf-
ficient to cause coronary occlusion 1 
''A I think so. 
"Q In other words, you sit here, and having 
heard this explanation made by Counsel, as to 
the condition of this individual, you arrive at an 
opinion as to what that degree of fatigue was 
from that description~ 
"A I think I mentioned fatigue as one factor. 
'' Q Then you mean to say, Doctor, in your 
judgment, this question all comes back to the 
fact, and that is whether the fatigue in and of 
itself would be sufficient in your opinion to cause 
under these circumstances, this coronary~ 
11 < 
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"A The fatigue, as indicated by a previous 
lack of rest. At that moment I was not consi-
dering any additional active effort. 
"Q No. 
''A I simply said that it added some ·force to 
the fatigue if we consider the case as a whole. 
"Q That means, does it not, an'alyzed, that 
fatigue in and of itself might not he sufficient, 
but added to some· other element might be suf-
ficient~ 
''A Wben there is fatigue-
" Q You are assuming a certain fatigue. You 
are assuming from the description that there 
was at least in connection with other factors, 
sufficient to cause this coronary, isn't that cor-
recti 
"A Immediate effort plus his previous effort 
which has been put down as fatigue, if you de-
sire, in the conditions such as existed here. 
'' Q Can you assume there was enough to 
cause fatigue~ 
"A I have not assumed that. 
'' Q I know, but assume there was no effort, 
but simply fatigue. 
''A Yes, I think fatigue-
" Q You think fatigue alone can do it, but it 
would have to be the kind of fatigue which in 
your judgment existed according to the descrip-
tion in this case~ 
d A It might give the headaches. 
"Q Would you say any fatigue whatever 
would cause it~ 
12 
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• • A "\Y onld yon please define fatigue'! 
· • Q I assume that yon meant a man being 
tired. Isn't that a description of it' 
'• A A man being tired may not be fatigue. 
He may be tired. \Y e are talking objectively 
about something that is supposed to be a burden 
on his physical status. 
•' Q You mean something that has made him 
fatigued, is that true 1 
"A Of course we can be tired without effort. 
• · Q I understand you to say there need be 
no effort, and that fatigue in and of itself is 
sufficient. Is that correct' 
"A Yes. 
·' Q What do you mean by fatigue' 
"A I think I have indicated that fatigue is 
the end result is any process representing an 
accumulation of waste, and a lack of rest, and 
resumption of normal activity. 
'' Q So it would be lack of bed rest' 
''A It can be, and ordinarily it is a physiol-
ogical change. 
'' Q Depending on the degree of fatigue and 
depending on the amount of rest that would be 
required. 
''A Up to a certain point, when you get to 
a certain point. 
'' Q Assuming when a man becomes tired he 
lies down and rests for awhile, wouldn't that 
have a tendency to overcome the fatigue 1 
''A It might. 
13 
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'' Q The duration of the rest might be very 
short and it might not, and still cause recovery 
from the fatigue? In other words, can I go home 
at noon very tired, and lie down for a long time, 
or rest, and completely recover from my fatigue¥ 
"A You may, and you may still be carry-
ing the debt. 
"Q At least the debt has been minimized, 
and may be minimized down enough so that I 
may wake up as fresh as I was in the morning¥ 
"A That would be the subjective view. 
"Q Isn't that also the objective view¥ 
"A Yes. 
And with respect to effort Dr. Zeman testified: 
"Q What do you say about effort f You 
have mentioned that as one of the factors. 
"A Yes. 
'' Q Assuming he was performing exactly 
the same duty under the same conditions exactly 
the day b~fore this as he was this day, that is, 
he was tinkering with the motor as has been des-
cribed either with relation to the carburetor or 
cranking it, exactly the same as the day before, 
would that have any effect upon your conclusion f 
''A We may have a number of variables, 
all of which are invariable. There might be one 
variable which he had that will produce what 
we have· here. 
"Q It might be a factor and it might not. 
''A All I can say, we have the end result. 
14 
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''Q Oh, yes, we have the end result. You 
are assuming now because a thing happened 
contemporaneously, they are related by cause 
and effect. 
"A In a way. 
'' Q Doctor, you testified sometime ago in 
the VVoodburn case? 
"A Yes. 
'' Q And that is a case where the man became 
tired too, was it not? 
"A Yes. 
'' Q And layed down as a result of being 
tired? 
"A Yes. 
'' Q And yet you testified in that case, did 
you not~ that the most that you could say was 
that it might be a possibility that there was some 
causal connection between the condition of the 
man and the coronary which ensued? 
''A That is a good many years ago. I have 
seen many cases since then. 
"Q You think you have acquired knowlege 
since then that made you change your opinion? 
"A Yes. 
'' Q And that is because of the fact that you 
have seen cases where there was fatigue and also 
a coronary thereafter, is that correct? 
''A Closely related thereafter. 
"Q And yet you have seen these cases where 
there was no fatigue, have you not? 
"A I think so, yes su. 
15' 
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'' Q But nevertheless, you conclude that be-
cause there was fatigue, and the coronary ensued, 
that therefore there is some causal connection bet-
ween the two, is that correct 1 
"A In this case, yes. 
'' Q In this case. Why do you distinguish 
this case from any other case 1 
"A Because there is a history. 
'' Q In other words, you have to have some-
thing else besides fatigue, do you not; you have 
to have effort, or you could not say there was 
any causal connection 1 
"A Effort and fatigue adds up to the same 
thing. 
'' Q Do you want to retract that statement 
that you just made that it would require effort 
in addition to fatigue~ 
"A No, I don't quite understand. 
'' Q Didn't you say that in this case, distin-
guishing it from other cases where there was 
mere fatigue, that there was also efforU 
"A No, that is not what I said. I said that 
coronary disease may occur without, but in this 
case it does not. 
'' Q I asked you why you distinguished bet-
ween this and other cases, and you said on account 
of effort. 
''A I said on account of the history. 
'' Q What is the history that causes you to 
distinguish this case from the other cases~ 
''A The history presented. 
16 
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· · Q 'Vhat are the factors 1 
"A Fatigue and effort, and somewhere 1 
got the suspicion there was emotion, but that 
was stricken. 
·• Q Do you eliminate emotion 1 
•• A I have not eliminated it. You eliminated 
it. 
· · Q You would say that irrespective of 
whether there was any emotional strain, fatigue 
and the other factors would be sufficient, is that 
correct? 
• 'A I don't know what it was that is in this 
case, but there was fatigue and also effort and 
also emotioH, and there may be enough in a de-
finite given case to produce coronary occlusion." 
(Emphasis added) 
As to Dr. Olson, he testified: 
"Q Well, Doctor when you get down to brass 
tacks on this situation, in your opinion, it depends 
on the extent of these factors you have named as 
to whether there would be any causal connection 
between them and the occlusion 1 
''A Only in degree. It is an individual in 
his environment. In orie individual it may take 
a tremendous amount, and in another very little. 
'' Q You didn't know this individual? 
"A No, but I know he had coronary throm-
bosis. 
"Q But you didn't know this particular in-
dividual, and you didn't know the effect or the 
effects it may have had on this individual1 
"A Not definitely, no. 
17 
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'' Q So you can't tell, can you, to what extent 
these various factors would affect this man as a 
particular individual~ 
"A As a matter of knowledge·, no. 
"Q Of course, as a matter of knowledge. Now 
you assumed in this case, stress, is that right, 
worry1 
''A Worry and concern. 
'' Q Concern. 
''A Anxiety. 
'' Q Anxiety. You are assuming that, but 
assuming that that was not present, then that 
would have to be eliminated, would it not? 
"A Certainly. If you assume they weren't 
present, they would be eliminated. 
'' Q To the extent he was tired or fatigued, 
that would also vary with respect to various 
individuals, would it not~ 
''A That is my experience. 
'' Q So there again that actual fact would 
have to be considered and it would have to 
be assumed by the prior evidence and that 
his being tired was of such a character that it 
would affect him, wouldn't you, or else you would 
have to eliminate that~ 
"A I see your method of approach. Let me 
get this-
" Q I don't care what my method of approach 
is. 
''A You are speaking as an experienced 
Attorney, and I am replying to you as an experi-
enced physican. If I am informed that a man has 
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worked in hot weatht>r and he wa~ working for 
sixteen or eighteen hours, and only a few, hours 
rest, and returned to that work, one has to con-
sider that one could not avoid experiencing ex-
haustion. 
'' Q You are assuming he had worked from 
sixteen to eighteen hours with only two hours 
rest and went back1 
''A I would not give you a basis in figures. 
"Q Those figures are what you used and you 
are assuming that as a fact in arriving at your 
conclusion 1 
''A Two or three hours rest, something like 
that, yes, of course. 
"Q And if that condition didn't exist, and 
he had sufficient rest from being tired, then you 
would have to eliminate that? 
''A That depends on the facts. 
'' Q Now the same is true with inhaling the 
fumes. It depends on the extent to which he 
would have inhaled them. I can walk by an auto-
mobile from which monoxide gas is eoming out 
of the exhaust, and still not consume enough to 
make me have coronary. 
''A Yes. I don't think that is too germane 
to this particular case. 
'' Q You are inclined to think the inhaling 
of the gas we are talking about is practically eli-
minated1 
''A I would not say that along with the other 
factors. I would say it is not very important. 
'' Q In other words, you base it on the anxiety 
or the stress and upon his being tired? 
19 
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''A I think it will have to be considered as be-
ing important because it increases the work on his 
heart, and it increases the metabolism and it 
ma:k:es agreater demand on the part of the heart. 
We know that this man had an atheromatous 
plaque, so that the muscles beyond that point 
where the atheromatous plaque is weren't sup-
plied with the oxgen required. 
"Q rrhen you would only include effort? 
"A Yes. 
'' Q Then the extent of that effort would also 
have a bearing, would it not, as a factor? 
''A Upon a given individual, and on this in-
dividual under the circumstances and in the en-
vironment. 
".Q In other words, it would have to be a 
combination? 
''A Yes, acting upon a particular individual. 
'' Q Acting upon a particular individual, and 
the extent to which these factors collectively 
would act on a particular individual is not known 
to you or anybody else¥ 
· ''A Certainly not known to me. 
'' Q Not known to you-I think that is all.'' 
It is obvious therefrom that both doctors agree 
that the importance of the factors of fatigue and exer-
tion depends upon the degree to which they are present, 
and the individual they are present in. In other words, 
as the saying goes, what is one man's meat is another 
man's poison. The facts stated in the hypothetical ques-
tion leave it purely a matter of conjecture as to how 
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much the deeea~ed ''as fatigued (it depend~ on the in-
dividual), and equally a matter of conjecture as to how 
much he wat' exerting himself. The exertion is des-
cribed as "'tinkering" about, and "off·and on cranking" 
of the motor. .:\8 a matter of fact, other than that it was 
· • small". the motor isn't even described, nor is there any 
evidence of ho'v much effort is required to crank it -
whether a mere flip of the wrist, or something more 
strenuous. 
Thus, from the end result of the coronary, and 
from that alone, the doctors assumed sufficient fatigue, 
effort, stress and what not were present to induce the 
result, but there is no evidence whatever as to the degree 
in which these factors in fact were present-if at all.· 
In other words, the doctors said that if present to 
a sufficient degree fatigue, effort and stress could 
produce a coronary. They admitted they didn't know 
the extent to which they were here present, but as a 
coronary occurred they ''assumed'' they were present 
to the requisite degree and this despite the fact they 
both admitted coronaries could occur without any of 
these factors present. It is small wonder that the Com-
mission looked upon their opinions as nothing more than 
glorified guesses. 
This Court has stated and restated the proposition _ 
that an award must be predicated upon substantial 
evidence, and that it cannot rest upon surmise or con-
jecture. 
Continental Casualty Co. v: Industrial Commis-
sion, 75 Utah 220, 284 P. 313. 
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Higley v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 361, 
285 P. 306. 
Sugar v. Industrial Commission, 94 Utah 56, 
75 P. 2d 311. 
General Mills v. Industrial Commission, 101, 
Utah 214, 120 P. 2d 279. 
Royal Canning Corp. v. Industrial Commission 
101 Utah 323, 120 P. 2d 406. 
Yet isn't that exactly what must here be done if an 
award is to be ·based upon the evidence in this cause? 
Both Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson admitted that whether 
exertion or fatigue or stress or lack of oxygen were 
factors in producing the coronary depended upon the 
''degree'' to which they were present. Both admitted 
that they did not know as a matter of fact the degree to 
which any were present. The hypothetical question, 
while stating a factual background from which some 
fatigue, some exertion, possibly some mental stress, and 
possibly some oxygen deficiency might be inferred, left 
it wholly a matter of conjecture or speculation as to 
the degree they were present, and their effect upon this 
individual. The doctors recognized this hiatus in their 
chain of reasoning, so they started from the end results 
and worked back-saying that since he had a coronary 
they would assume that these factors were present to a 
sufficient degree to have caused it, and that they did 
cause it. This would be well and good if th~y would 
take the position that these factors are necessary to 
produce a coronary-for then it would be logical to say 
that since there was a coronary it necessarily follows 
that the essential producing factors were present. 
22 
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But once it is admitted, as these doctors do admit 
(and for that matter all doctors) that coronaries do 
occur where there is no evidence of the presence of any 
of these factors> as it is in case of persons asleep, or 
in hospitals undergoing complete bed rest, then the 
logic of working back from the end result lose·s its 
force. 
Dr. Zeman testified on cross examination (Tr.- 135-
136): 
"'Q What do you say about effort? You 
have mentioned that as one of the factors. 
"A Yes. 
'' Q Assuming he was performing exactly 
the same duty under the same conditions exactly 
the day before this as he was this day, that is, 
he was tinkering With the motor as has been 
described either with relation to the carburetor 
or cranking it, exactly the same as the day be-
fore, would that have any effect upon your con-
clusion! 
''A We may have a number of variables, all 
of which are invariable. There might be one 
variable which he had that will produce what we 
have here. 
"Q It might be a factor and it might not? 
"A All I can say, we have the end result. 
'' Q Oh, yes, we have the end result. You 
are assuming now because a thing happened con-
temporaneously, they are related by ca.use and 
effect. 
"A In a way." (Emphasis added) 
And again ( Tr. 137) : 
23'. 
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'' Q But nevertheless, you conclude that be-
cause there was fatigue, and the coronary ensued, 
that therefore there is some casual connection 
between the two, is that correct~ 
''A In this case, yes.'' 
And again (Tr. 138) : 
"A I don't know what it was that is in this 
case, but there was fatigue and also effort and 
also emotion, and there may be enough in a 
definite given case to produce a coronary occlus-
ion.'' 
Now as to Dr. Olson ( Tr. 164) : 
"Q Well, Doctor, when you get down to 
brass tacks on this situation, in your op1n1on, 
it depends on the extent of these factors you 
have named as to whether there would be any 
casual connection between them and the occlu-
sion~ 
''A Only in degree. It is an individual in 
his environment. In one individual it may take 
a tremendous amount, and in another very little. 
'' Q You didn't know this individual~ 
''A No, but I know he had coronary throm-
bosis. 
"Q But you didn't know this particular in-
dividual, and you don't know the effect or the 
effects it may have had on this individual~ 
''A Not definitely, no. 
'' Q So you can't tell, can you, to what ex-
tent these various factors would affect this man 
as a particular individual¥ 
''A As a matter of knowledge, no.'' 
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And again ( 'l'r. 166) : 
"Q Then you would only include effort~ 
"A Yes. 
4
' Q Then the extent of that effort would also 
have a bearing, would it not, as a factor~ 
''A Upon a given individual, and on this 
individual, under the circumstances and in the 
environment. 
'' Q In other words, it would have to he a 
combination~ 
''A Yes, acting upon a particular individual. 
'' Q Acting upon a particular individual, and 
the extent to which these factors collectively 
would act on a particular individual is not known 
to you or anybody else 7 
''A Certainly not known to me.'' 
Thus, it is apparent that both Dr. Olson and Dr. 
Zeman, in order to reach the conclusions they did, had 
to assume the existence of the factors to the degree 
necessary to produce the result. There was and is no 
evidence whatever in the record with respect to degree. 
The most that can be said is that there is some evidence 
of some effort and some fatigue, and possibly some 
emotional stress and some oxygen deficiency. Under 
those circumstances it may have been all right for the 
doctors arbitrarily to assume the presence of these 
factors to the necessary degree, but certainly the Com-
mission wasn't required so to do. In fact for it to 
have so done would have been error. 
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The important thing in this case according to these 
two doctors is the question of the degree to which their 
factors were present. There is no evidence whatever 
upon this question of degree. It must be supplied by 
conjecture and speculation. The doctors, in order to 
reach a conclusion, may take the end result and work 
backwards, and come up with the necessary degree, but 
the commission cannot do so. The doctors may reach 
a conclusion predicated upon conjecture and guess work 
if they elect so to do. They are controlled in that re-
gard only by their consciences. But the Commission is 
controlled by law, and the law says, speaking through 
this court, that the Commission may not make an award 
upon conjecture and surmise. It must have substantial 
evidence. And in this case, substantial evidence of 
what? Substantial evidence of the degree to which the 
factors essential to Dr. Zeman's and Dr. Olson's theories 
were in fact present. 
That an opinion based upon speculation or con-
jecture is wholly without probative force has long been 
recognized by the courts. Similarly without weight is 
an opinion based upon a contingency. 
Henley v. Braden (Ky) 91 S.W. 2d 34. 
Webster v. Archer (Md- 4 A. 2d 434. 
Masser v. Foxworthy (Colo.) 281 P. 360. 
The contingency here, insofar as Dr. Zeman and 
Dr. Olson were concerned, was the presence to the neces-
sary degree of the factors effort, fatigue and stress. 
Absent a showing by evidence of the presence of those 
factors to tha.t degree, by evidence which the Commis-
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... -\.n interesting decision along these lines i~ that of 
Hamilton v. Hueber, (Neb) 19 N.W. 2d 552, a workmen's 
compensation case, wherein the employee suffered a 
coronary while cranking a motor. The court held: 
"'We have many times held that an award of 
compensation cannot be sustained if based upon 
possibilities, probabilities, conjectural or specu-
lative evidence. Williams v. Watson Bros. Trans-
portation Co. 145 Neb.--, 16 N. W. 2d 199, 202. 
''However, viewing the expert evidence in 
its most favorable light to the plaintiff, it is 
quite apparent that the expert premised his con-
clusion-s upon the existence of two fact elements, 
an overexertion and a fall. 
''We recently have held: 'The val-p.e of the 
opinion of an expert ·witness is dependent on. 
and is no stronger than, the facts on which it is 
predicated. The opinion has no probative force 
unless the premises upon which it is based are 
shown to be true.' Williams v. Watson Bro~. 
Transportation Co., supra.'' 
" * * * 
"There is no evidence in this record of any 
overexertion or of any particular amount of 
exer:tion in the work of attempting to start this 
engine. It does not appear that the deceased 
told the doctor of any overexertion. The testi-
mony in the record as to the method of starting 
this engine, the short pull or jerk followed by a 
pause and rewinding, the small amount of force 
necessary in the process, all negative any in-
ference or conclusion that there was or could 
have been any overexertion. Mere exertion, w:hich 
is not greater than that ordinarily inciqent to 
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the employment, which combined with pre-exist-
ing disease produces disability, does not con-
stitute a compensable accidental injury.'' 
We have the utmost sympathy for the survivors of 
this decedent. We likewise have the utmost sympathy 
for the members of this court in their endeavors to 
benefit such survivors financially, but we respectfully 
submit that the majority opinion exemplifies perfectly 
the old adage that "hard facts make bad law". To 
cope with these "hard facts" the majority in effect 
instructs the commission to ignore the fact that there 
is no substantial evidence of the degree to which effort, 
fatigue, stress and oxygen deficiency were present, and 
to assume without evidence, as the doctors did, that 
they were present to the requisite degree. 
We return momentarily to the case of Morris v. In-
dustrial Commission, supra, and the requirements laid 
down by this court for reversal by it of a judgment of 
the Commission denying an award. This court there 
observed: 
"In this case even if conditions (a). (b) 
and (c) were present ( i. e. that the evidence is 
uncontradicted, that it is not intrinsically im-
probabh~, and that it is not entirely from in-
terested witnesses) which they are not, the RtJ-
plicant 's whole case would rest on the a biiity 
of the opinion evidence to carry conviction. If 
the party appealing should have put one or 
more doctors on the stand to give opinion evi-
dence, and even though uncontradicted it did not 
carry conviction either because of speculation 
or improbability inherent in it or because the 
doctors themselves stated that their opinions 
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were nothing more than intelligent gue~~e~, <~-: 
frankly stated in this case by Dr. Spragtw and 
at least one other doctor, the commission would 
not be required as a matter of law to folio\\' 
such evidence.'' 
That exnetly is the situation here. Dr. Olson's and Dr. 
Zeman's conclusions require the assumption of a degree 
of fatigue, effort, strain, etc. They admit they did not 
know the degree to which they were present. Hence, 
their conclusions of causal connection of necessity could 
not be more than intelligent guesses. This is confirmed 
by the testimony of Dr. Petersen to the effect that it is 
impossible to tell in any particular case whether there 
is any casual connection between effort, fatigue, stress, 
etc. and a coronary. This was but another way of 
saying that the doctor who dogmatically says there is 
or is not a connection is but guessing. 
The majority says: 
''It was not for Dr. Petersen to say whether 
Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson were sure of their 
opinions and thus, in effect, to evaluate their 
testimony.'' 
But why wasn't it~ In every case where there is 
a contradiction between witnesses isn't each in effect 
evaluating the testimony of the other as valueless 1 
Take a simple case. Witness A testifies an object is 
round, and Wi~ness B that it is square. Isn't each, by 
contradicting the other, evaluating the other's testi-
mony1 Now assume that Witness B, instead of testify-
ing the object was square, testifies instead that 
"No one can say what shape it was. The 
night was dark and the object was not visible.'' 
:29 
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Would it be suggested, under these circumstances, that 
the trier of the fact would be obliged as a matter of 
law to find that the object was round 1 Certainly not. 
As the trier of the fact he could find that the premise 
upon which A's testimony rested, namely, that he could 
see the object, did not exist, and thereupon refuse to 
find that the object was round. 
Now why isn't that the case here of the medical 
testimony1 Dr. Olson and Dr. Zeman say the fatigue, 
effort, stress, etc. was the cause. Dr. Petersen said 
"No one can say with any degree of certainty." Where 
is the impropriety in that testimony1 Why is Dr. 
Petersen without right thus to evaluate the testimony 
of Dr. Olson and Dr. Zeman 1 And most of all, why is 
the Commission not entitled to believe the testimony of 
Dr. Petersen that "no one can say", and thus conclude 
that the affirmative opinions at most were intelligent 
guesses1 
This court has held that the Commission may not 
without reason disregard uncontradicted evidence, but 
it has, of course, further held that the Commission is 
not required to believe evidence inherently unreasonable 
or improbable, even though uncontradicted. Dr. Peter-
sen testified that whether there was any causal con-
nection is ''impossible to say''. If this be so ,and the ' 
Commission was entitled to believe him, then the affirm-
ative testimony of Dr. Olson and Dr. Zeman becomes 
"unreasonable", and of the type the Commission was 
not required to give credence to. It's like the example 
previously referred to-if the trier of the facts believes 
that the night was dark he is not required to believe 
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the uncontradieted eYideuee or the witness that the 
object \\as round. This because the witness's inability 
to see renders unreasonable his testimony as to the 
object's appearance. By the same token, if the ·com-
mission believed that the subject was full of contra-
dictions, as reflected in the medical literature; that 
just as many coronaries occurred where there was no 
evidence of effort, fatigue or emotional stress as when 
there was such evidence; then the Commission was not 
arbitrary in not agreeing with the conclusions of the 
doctors, even though their conclusions were uncontra-
dicted, because they become unreasonable. 
We perhaps unduly labor the matter, but the im-
portance of the subject undoubtedly warrants its every 
consideration. To that end we would approach the 
question of whether the Commission was arbitrary in 
not accepting the conclusions of Dr. Zeman and Dr. 
Olson because their testimony was ''uncontradicted'' 
-assuming it was. In this particular connection what 
we want the court to bear in mind is that what we 
have at most is an uncontradicted opinion, as disting-
uished from uncontradicted evidence as to facts. In 
other words, is the opinion of an expert, even when 
uncontradicted, conclusive upon the trier of the fact. 
We submit not. Cases upon this subject are legion, 
and among other places may be found cited in the foot 
notes to the text in 32 C.J.S. (Evidence) page 389, et 
seq. 
This court has spoken in regard thereto in Kelly 
v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 73, 12 P. 2d 1112: 
:Jl 
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"The question of whether the employee was 
totally and permanently disabled was the ultimate 
matter to be decided by the commission, upon all 
the evidence in the case. Upon this direct 
question expert witnesses may not properly ex-
press opinions. Utah Copper Co. v. Ind. Com., 
69 Utah 452, 256 P. 397. ~so see Annotation, 
78 A. L. R. 755. .At least the commission is not 
bound by such opinion evidence.'' 
We recognize that there is an exception, recognized 
by some courts, to the rule that the uncontradicted 
opinion of an expert is not conclusive upon the trier of 
the fact, namely, where the subject concerns a matter 
of science or specialized art of which a layman can 
have no knowledge. Even that exception could have no 
applicability here, because the question involved wa:; 
not "what caused his death" (a coronary thrombosis),. 
which we would agree is a question for the experts, 
but whether such cause of death arose out of or in the 
course of his employment. In other words, the opinion 
as to the cause of death might be said to be conclusive, 
but the opinion that such cause was industry connected 
cannot be conclusive. This, of course, was the effect 
of the Kelly decision, supra, wherein this court held 
that the Commission is not bound by expert testimony. 
in deciding the ultimate question involved. 
We have heretofore suggested to the court that it 
was not error for the Commission to fail to find that 
there was no unusual strain or overexertion, that there 
was no unusual fatigue, and that there was no emotional 
stress. At the risk of unduly prolonging this support-
ing brief we refer briefly to the evidence from which we 
contend the commission was justified in so finding. 
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Flora K. Jones, the widow, testified that on the 
night preceding his death her husband went to bed at 
8:30p.m. That he lay awhile in front of the door and 
later in his bed. He got up just before two. (Tr. 33). 
Thus he had some five and one-half hours of rest. He 
returned home from work at about 6 :30 A.M. for 
breakfast, and then went back to work. (Tr. 41). 
William 0. Glasgow, an employee, was at the viner 
from about 4:30 A.:~.L to 6 :30 A.M. on the date of de-
cedent's death. During this period the decedent spent 
about thirty minutes helping the witness unload the 
empty boxes from his truck and load it with full boxes. 
The witness noticed nothing unusual about the decedent. 
( Tr. 192-194). 
The witness Spencer Porter talked with the decedent 
at about seven o'clock in the morning of his death, at 
which time he discussed the trouble he was having get-
ting the motor started. ( Tr. 182). 
The witnesses Elmer Potako, Othello Munn, George 
Garner, Franz Fowers, Nelson W. Arave, and George 
S. Moore all testified to seeing decedent at varying times 
during the morning of his death, and testified as to his 
activities. Their testimony showed that between two 
o'clock, when he came to work, and eight-thirty, when 
he first became ill, his activities were varied. He gen-
erally supervised the operations of the viner, he helped 
Glasgow load his truck, he went home to breakfast, he 
talked on the phone, and he worked over the small 
motor. The nature and extent of his work on the motor 
varied with the different witnesses-and incidentally 
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Othello Munn testified the decedent was "over the 
motors all day" (Tr. 49); "he was at it all day long" 
(Tr. 49); and "he was over the motor all day long 
practically" (Tr. 50). This testimony the Commission 
gave little credence to because it conflicted with other 
known facts as to decedent's activities during the period. 
On the other hand the witness Franz Fowers testi-
fied he watched the decedent for an hour starting at 
three o'clock, at which time he was trying to get the 
carburetor adjusted and at no time during this time did 
he crank the motor. (Tr. 96). 
Let's analyze it thus far. He came to work at two 
o'clock. (Tr. 176). The motor ran satisfactorily for 
about forty-five minutes (Tr. 182), which would be 
shortly befort three o'clock. From three to four he was 
adjusting the carburetor-not cranking (Tr. 96). For 
at least thirty minutes between four-thirty and six-thirty 
he was helping Glasgow load his truck (Tr. 192-194); 
from six-thirty to seven he was at breakfast (Tr. 41). 
At seven o'clck he was talking on the phone to the com-
pany mechanic, Spencer Porter, about the motor, and 
Porter told him they would send down an auxiliary. 
(Tr. 182). At some time between seven and eight-thirty 
the decedent was taken ill ( Tr. 151). Thus, we have at 
most a two hour period between four and six-thirty, and 
possibly some time between seven and eight-thirty (al-
though it is doubtful that decedent did much if any 
cranking after talking to the mechanic Porter at seven 
o'clock) when any cranking at all was done. It is 
obvious, therefor, that despite the zeal of some of the 
witnesses in behalf of claimant's cause he was not crank-
ing the motor ''all day long'', or working over the motor 
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"practically all day··. On the other hand, it is apparent 
that during the six hours preceding the time he was 
taken ill he did very little cranking. Actually, rather 
than cranking, hi~ 'vork about the motor consisted pri-
marily of trying to adjust the carburetor-or ''tinker-
ing'' as some of the witnesses called it-with the big mo-
tor turning the little motor. 
We realize, of course, that there was evidence to 
have supported a finding of unusual exertion if the 
Commission had believed, for example, Othello Munn 
that the decedent was cranking all day long. That, how-
ever, it not the point. The Commission did not believe 
that evidence, and our contention is that the evidence 
as a whole is such that it cannot be said that the Com-
mission was required to find, as a matter of law, that 
there was unusual exertion. In other words, the Com-
mission was justified in finding that his work on this 
particular day was no more arduous or severe than 
normal during the pea run. Also, in view of the fact 
that he had some five and one-half hours' rest the night 
before, albeit somewhat restless because of the heat, 
he was not in that condition of fatigue necessary to the 
conclusions of Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson. 
Now, as to emotional stress, the only evidence 
whatever on this is the testimony of the witness Earl 
Christensen-a son-in-law of the decedent. His testi-
mony was as follows: 
"Q Did you observe anything as to Mr. 
Jones' demeanor, and how did he look~ 
''A He was rather tired. 
"Q He appeared that wayf 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"A Yes, he appeared quite tired. 
'' Q Did the conversation have to do with his 
physical condition or nervous condition~ 
MR. HOWELL: Answer yes or no. 
"A Yes. 
"Q What did he say~ 
MR. HOWELL: I object to that as being in-
competent, irrelevant and immaterial and hear-
say, if your Honor please. 
CO~L WIErSLEY: The objection is well 
taken. 
"Q In the conversation, did he tell you he 
was constantly having trouble with the machinery 
breaking down, and being driven half crazy and 
worried, and by reason of these effects he just 
could not sleep. 
MR. HOWELL: We object to it upon the 
ground that it is assuming something not in 
evidence, and hearsay. 
COl\1. WIESLEY: Did this conversation take 
place on the night of the 2nd~ 
MR. DOBBS : Yes, about fourteen hours be-
fore his death. 
MR. HOWELL: Yes, and prior to any attack 
of any sort so far as any evidence shows here. 
COM:. WIESLEY: Do you remember exactly 
what he said~ 
"A Yes, sir. 
COl\1.. WIESLEY : I am go1ng to let him 
answer. 
''A He was milking the cows. 
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CO~l. WIESLEY: You should rt>1wat tbd 
conversation as nearly as yon can. 
• 'A He said he was having a lot of trouble 
with the motor machinery in the viner, and I 
asked him what sort of trouble he ·wa~ having and 
he said the biggest thing that troubled him \YH' 
this motor, that it would not run, and it would 
backfire, and he said around the cracks in th<) 
pipe of the exhaust was covered-he said it vYaf; 
a white-yellow. 
COl\1. WIESLEY: Now-
MR. PATTERSON: It is a part of the con-
versation and it relates to l\Ir. Jones' demeanor. 
1\IR. HOWELL: I object to it as leading. He 
has not said anything about the worry so far. 
CO~I. WIESLEY: We are interested in hit-; 
physical condition. What was the conversation 
as near as you can remember~ We know ahout 
the exhaust pipe and the grease and all those 
things. What else did he say~ 
"A I asked him that night if he would like 
to ride up on the Highway Sunday, and he said 
no, he didn't sleep well last night, it was too hot, 
and he said, 'I am tired and I think I can sleep 
tonight.' He said, 'I am going to try to go to 
bed.''' 
The sum and substance of it is that on the evening 
preceding his death "he appeared quite tired" (which 
certainly isn't unusual for anyone after a day's work), 
and that he was having trouble with one of the motors 
at the viner. From this evidence, and from the other 
evidence that there was in fact motor trouble, the 
majority of the eourt would require the Commission 
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as a matter of law to find that such an emotional state 
had been built up in the mind of the decedent as to 
precipitate, or be a factor in precipitating, a coronary 
thrombosis. And this despite the fact that no witness 
testified that he was wrought up or mentally disturbed 
over the matter On the contrary, the decedent's only 
comment was that he hadn't slept well the night before 
because "it was hot", but that tonight he was tired and 
''I think I can sleep tonight.'' 
We respectffully submit that if, upon the state of 
this record, the Court is to require the Commission to 
reverse its findings, saying that as a matter of law 
the Commission must find that there was unusual effort, 
and abnormal fatigue, and emotional stress brought 
on by his work, sufficient, either singly or in combi-
nation, to have caused this coronary, the Commission 
may no longer maintain its position granted under the 
statute as the finder of the facts. 
No one in this whole world, including the doctors, 
know how much effort, how much fatigue, how much 
emotional upset was necessary to precipitate a coronary 
in this individual, even under the doctors' own theory 
of causal relation between effort, fatigue, stress and 
coronaries. The doctors admit that what would be 
sufficient in one person would be wholly insufficient in 
another. Neither the Commission, the witnesses, the 
doctors, nor this court knows to what extent, if any, 
the effort, the fatigue, and the strain here present af-
fected the physical condition of this decedent. All that 1 
is known is that the decedent had a coronary, and that 
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in some instanc.:es ( ael·ording to some doctors) effort, 
fatigue or emotional upset, working upon a body prop-
erly ripe for tt. may cause a coronary. 
Based wholly upon the end result of the coronary, 
and despite the fact that coronaries may occur and in 
no wise be attributable to effort, fatigue or stress, the 
majority of this court would say to the Commission that 
it has no right nor power to find what the facts are with 
respect to the effort, fatigue and stress here present, 
and their effect upon this individual, but must find, as 
a matter of law, that they were here present in suf-
ficient degree to meet the wholly unknown require-
ments of Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson. 
This, to us, is the equivalent of holding that where 
a coronary occurs while the individual is at work it 
will be conclusively presumed to be industry connected. 
If that is to be the law in Utah then industry must know 
it in no uncertain terms and govern itself accordingly 
in its employee relationships. 
Such a fundamental change 1n the law, however, 
is a matter for the Legislature, not for the court, and 
until the Legislature speaks on that subject the power 
of the Commission to find what the facts actually are 
must be left undisturbed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons we respectfully petition 
the Court for a rehearing herein, and that it re-examine 
the issues here presented. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, Attorney 
General of the State of U tab 
Attorney for the Industrial 
Commission of U tab. 
HOWELL, STINE & OLMSTEAD, 
Attorneys for 
California Packing Corporation. 
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